Household Migration Decisions as Survival Strategy:
1.

Introduction
Restriction of the movement of persons is increasingly gaining recognition as a severe impediment to trade, particularly in services. Removal of these restrictions could result in important benefits to the world as a whole and in particular to the suppliers of this labor. Hamilton and Whalley (1984) suggested that the liberalization of world labor markets could double world income and imply proportionately even larger gains for the developing countries. Thus allowing labor to move between countries would seem to be an important tool for growth and development. The migrant workers produce, earn wages, pay taxes and consume in the host country, as well as send remittances back to their home countries. However what makes poor countries economic situation worse is that whatever quantities of human capital are formed; a certain proportion is lost through the migration leakage. Even though it is generally recognized that migration benefits are dampened with the above brain-drain phenomenon, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for national preference concerning access to employment in the private sector. Not only that the latter provisions discriminate against all foreigners including member states, it also urges enterprises to achieve in a very short run (two years maximum) a complete nationalization of employment. The new law will add to the administrative obstacles and restrictive migration policies that migrants already faced. In general the worsening sociopolitical crisis in Côte d'Ivoire remains a critical threat to the integration process.
Recent changes in the regional migration pattern are observed, especially an important (economic-driven and forced) return migration to Burkina Faso.
Even under the perspective of a long run increased factors' mobility in UEMOA, Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and Robichaud (2000) concluded that Burkina Faso could be the main loser in the regional integration because its labor and capital are moving into Côte d'Ivoire. In Burkina Faso where agriculture and livestock farming involve 87 percent of the active population, the exodus of farmers could result in important loss of agricultural production. Obviously, the latter conclusion does not take into account the mitigating economic effects of migration that occur through human capital formation, technology diffusion, remittances, creation of business and trade networks, and return migration.
Considering household units, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) shows
that the easing of the surplus and risk constraints is a crucial condition for the small farmer to carry out desired technological change. Thus, migration and remittances could increase production output of the migrant household if they release the constraints that are limiting the expansion of their activity. The resulting benefits are expected to be stronger in the case of seasonal migration as opposed to geographically distant and permanent migration. First, in the case of missing or imperfect labor market, the household must rely on the family labor and thus sending a household member may also prevent the household from moving toward the local high-return activity. The adverse effect of lost labor 2 may be higher when migration is permanent and migrants tend to be younger and better educated than an average rural laborer. Second, the household migration strategy raises also the question of asymmetric information. Any risk-pooling mechanism must overcome the information and enforcement problems associated with insurance contracts. The insurer might be subject to either moral hazard or adverse selection or both as discussed in Azam and Gubert (2002) and de la Briere, Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Lambert (2002) . The preceding shortcomings of the migration strategy are less likely to hold in the specific context of sahelian migration that is largely seasonal (Hampshire 2002) . The main characteristics that appear from national censuses and 2
If a migrant household's marginal product on the farm is positive, farm production will fall when the household sends out-migrants, due to the reduction in available labor.
4 migration surveys allow describing West African migration as a temporary or circular labor migration (Cordell, Gregory and Piché 1996) . In their case study of the rural semiarid sahelian village of Zaradougou in Mali, de Haan, Brock and Coulibaly (2002) The current paper aims to shed light on the motivations for sahelian seasonal migration and to allow a better understanding of its welfare implications. Migration activities play a central role in the decision of Burkina Faso to participate profitably in a regional common market. Burkina Faso is the largest supplier of migration labor to Côte d'Ivoire. There is a long history of migration between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire that started before the constitution of the two countries, during French colonization (Zanou, 2001) . First, considered as a labor pool for the economic development of the neighboring countries, the erstwhile forced migration became the outcome of the free decision of the Burkinabè households after independence. Therefore since the 1960s, the labor mobility responded to strong demographic and economic differences between the two countries and has been reinforced by the constitution of regional and common currency blocks. Farmers leave their dry lands in Burkina Faso for the available and favorable lands for cocoa and coffee farming and the forests in Côte d'Ivoire.
The strategy in the current study is twofold. First I develop a simple model that deals with the question of the benefits of further regional liberalization of the movement of labor through the constitution of a common market. Second I re-examine the uncertain economic impact of the Union for landlocked countries (Decaluwé, Dumont, Mesplé-Somps, and Robichaud 2000) . The migration model introduced by Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) has been for long time the dominant formal theory of migration in developing countries. In this early literature, income gap (or expected income) 5 constitutes the principal aspect of migration motivation. The larger is this gap, the stronger is the propensity of migration. However, with the NELM, migration is no more solely an individual decision but rather a decision made at household level. Beyond income gap 3 , factors such as individual and family characteristics, risk coping strategies and labor and capital market imperfections in the destination and home countries influence the migration decisions, too (Stark 2003) .
The empirical part first analyzes the determinants of migrants' income at home and in the host country. In a second step, I study the impact of income gap on migration decision. Using the survey data collected in northeastern Burkina Faso in summer 2002, I
test the prediction of the Todaro model. The latter cannot fully cover the specific context of the Sahel and is complemented with the NELM. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a brief review of the principal theory, the Todaro model, and its recent developments is undertaken. Section 3 presents the econometric model used. Then, the data and the estimation methods are described and the related methodological problems highlighted in section 4. The econometric results follow in the same section. I close the study by drawing the main conclusions and subsequent research perspectives.
Understanding the migration phenomenon
In the theories and policies of economic growth and development, migration of labor is regarded as a key instrument to promote economic welfare. Similarly, most trade theories emphasize factor mobility as an important policy instrument to achieve a high level of economic development. As mentioned by Ghatak, Levine and Price (1996) , recent evidence seems to underline the case for adopting economic policies which would:
(a) Re-allocate labor from low productivity to high productivity areas. Migration is socially desirable as long as it transfers labor from low to high productivity areas; and (b) Promote factor mobility and improve efficiency of the tradable sector so that trade could be regarded as an engine of economic growth.
3
Migration is fundamentally dissimilar to the flow of water, which will always be observed in the presence of height differentials.
6
Since Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) Mutual interdependence inside the household unit, uncertainty and relative deprivation, and imperfect and incomplete markets and financial institutions are the fundamental premises that enable to include the risk-averse behavior, key aspect of the New Economics of labor Migration (Stark 1991) .
The potential migrants consider the various opportunities on the labor markets of the two countries and then choose either to migrate toward the host country or to remain home to maximize their expected utility. Therefore, the decision to migrate depends basically on an evaluation made by the migrant of the expected incomes. Expected incomes depend on the current wages in the destination country and a subjective evaluation of the probability to get a job that depends on the unemployment rate. The higher the anticipated income gain; the higher will be the propensity of migrating. In a formal way, the present value of expected net income of a migrant is given by:
where w f and w h represent respectively the average income of the foreign country and that of the home country; r, the discount rate reflecting the preference of the migrant for the 7 present time; p, the probability to find employment abroad and C, the approximation for the economic and psychological cost of the migration. 
The underlying assumption is that of full employment in the attractive destination before migration occurs. Zanou (2001) Equation (3) can now be re-written to get the migration rate at equilibrium:
with the subsequent results (Ghatak, Levine and Price 1996): 0; 0; 0; 0 Borjas and Freeman (1992) argued that the magnitude and composition of immigrant flows are determined by the labor market opportunities (including real wages, costs of migrating and uncertainty) in the host country relatively to those in the home country.
An alternative to the view that migration decision is simply a response to a foreign-domestic wage differential has been brought by the NELM. In their survey Ghatak, Levine and Price (1996) argued that evidence on international migration showed that migration does not flow automatically in response to wage differentials.
Characteristics of migrants and the process of self-selection are found to be important determinants of the rate of migration. Based on these findings that factors other than earnings differences influence migration decisions, the theory can be broadened to explain why migration sometimes fails to occur even when substantial earnings differences exist, or why migration will continue even without such differentials (see several illustrations in Stark 2003 operates as a risk management strategy and/or as a way to ease the liquidity constraint of the household in the absence of insurance and credit market. Bardhan and Udry (1999) showed that migration is one of the strategies that households use to ensure that their incomes do not fluctuate too severely. Households might spread their members across space through migration in order to reduce the variance of the aggregate household income. According to the new portfolio investment theory, families indeed spread their labor assets over geographically dispersed and structurally different markets to reduce risks and some evidence suggests that after migration, members of the family combine and share their incomes. Such pooling is regarded as a form of insurance against uncertain income flows from specific markets and helps smoothing the family consumption path. Thus, if future earnings are uncertain and imperfectly but positively related in a geographically specific area, the migration policy of a member of the incomepooling family diversifies risk (Stark, 1991) . Ghatak, Levine and Price (1996) formalized some of the premises of the NELM by generalizing the above HT model. The idea that migration results from a family's optimizing decisions implies a choice concerning which 5 family member(s) migrate to maximize remittances to the home family. As long as the family can induce income transfers among its members, it will send family members abroad to maximize the 5 A family that seeks to increase the likelihood of its migrant to find a job may invest in the migrant's skills.
family's net wealth. This relates to a cooperative game framework where the stayers and the migrant member take a joint decision that secures a mutually advantageous coordination. Similar results appear when the decision to remit by a particular migrant is a contribution to investment in household assets later to be inherited. The parent who holds the bequest can allocate it according to the children relative attentions (strategic bequest motives).
Let the utility of a representative family be U(Y) where Y is income and U is a concave utility function with
Let the family or household chooses a proportion M of the family to migrate. As before let N be the home labor force so that is the total migration. The family chooses the proportion M of its members to migrate at a cost rC per period. Migrants obtain employment with probability p at a foreign wage W . The proportion that remains, 1-M, receives a domestic wage W .
be the net foreign wage after paying for migration costs. Then the family maximizes his expected per period utility:
Now let consider the simple case of a logarithmic functional form for the utility
, then the equilibrium conditions of the probability of migration give the following outcome:
provided that the right hand side of (7) 
is also the condition for any migration at the household unit level. Finally the substitution of the probability of obtaining
into (7) gives the equilibrium household migration rate.
The current study constitutes an important step to the evaluation of the economywide effect of changes in factors mobility flows inside UEMOA under the assumption that good and factors flows are complements. According to Markusen (1983) , the widely held notion, that trade in goods and factors are substitutes, is in fact a rather specific result that only occurs in the factor proportions models. Even within the latter framework, Razin and Sadka (1997) show that, when both commodity trade and factor mobility are simultaneously possible, the outcome can be a complete indeterminacy between the two modes of international flows that are commodity trade and factor mobility. The alternative bases for trade (returns to scale, imperfect competition, production and factors taxes, and differences in production technologies) share the common characteristic that factor mobility leads to an increase in the volume of world trade. Grether, De Melo, and Müler (1999) Economic activities at the destination range from the very lucrative trade in livestock, to temporary wage labor, informal self-employment, to begging.
Squares (OLS) are simply biased. The regression model that includes the above selection issue is the migration model à la Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) . The simultaneous system writes:
Net benefit of moving: It is a different computation that arrives at the same value because the Gaussian is symmetric. Ag are obtained from from the probit estimation on whether the net benefit of moving is observed. Heckman (1979) argues that the IMR function is a monotone decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into the analyzed sample.
The Heckman's two-step estimation procedure applies to each of the selected group (movers and stayers) taking into account the fact that migrants and nonmigrants face distinct labor market structure respectively in Côte d'Ivoire and in Burkina Faso. For observations in each group, the probit equation (8)' is estimated to obtain estimates of α and γ and compute the inverse Mills' ratio. At a second step of the Heckman procedure, the inverse Mills' ratio is added to the earnings equation to produce the consistent estimates of β and λ β . Finally the semi-structural model of migration of first interest can be studied to test the prediction of the Todaro model and those of the NELM respectively using the expected income gap for each household and the risk-related covariates.
( )
However the coefficients estimated measure how the log-odds in favor of migrating change as the independent variables change by a unit. For interpretation, marginal effects should then be computed and several other approaches for interpreting nonlinear outcomes for meaningful profiles of the independent variables can be used (Long and Freese 2001) .
Estimation
There is a considerable body of empirical work on internal migration using crosssectional survey data and based on a discrete choice model. Lucas (1988) and Zhu (2002) are some applications on Botswana and China, respectively. However, the specificity of the current paper remains the regional focus and the detailed information collected at destination and sending zones. The rich household, village and institutions level surveys data collected in 2002 at the origin country (Burkina Faso) allow the first detailed empirical analysis of migration in West Africa.
At the core of the estimation model is an earning equation expressing households' income as a function of individual and external characteristics. First, I estimate the income equations for the migrants and nonmigrants in Burkina Faso. Second, I study the impact of the income gap between these two groups on the seasonal migration decision.
The method is a structural probit model using the two-step procedure developed by Heckman (1979) and applied in previous studies such as Nakosteen and Zimmer (1980) ; Perloff (1991) ; Agesa and Agesa (1999) .
Data source
The In 2002, 9 enumerators participated in the survey, grouped together in three teams with a leader. The latter is responsible of administering the village and institutions levels survey and holds a role of coordinator in the conduct of the survey. Before interviews, 250 households were sampled using the sampling frame of the first round. 10 After first data cleaning and editing, corrections were made for the outliers. The total final sample includes 250 households among which 69 seasonal migrants. The seasonal economic migrant is defined as a household whose member migrant stays less than a year in the destination country. It ensures that migration is not incompatible with continuing involvement with agropastoral production. Cross-checking of the seasonal status was made through a direct question about migrants' return plan. Hampshire (2002) finds that the Fulani, main ethnic group of Seno-Oudalan 11 , has a median length of time spent away of five months and she defined a notion of short-term, non-local economic migration called "exode" that is a movement for duration of between one month and two years. This compares to the average length of stay in the CAPRi dataset, which is 7 months when it is the head of household who migrates.
Estimation samples
The In total the potential estimation sample for the current seasonal migration study is composed of 204 households, movers to Côte d'Ivoire and stayers. However, not all information was available in the case of one household and the latter is lost in the estimation procedure as a result of casewise deletion of observations with missing information. There exist econometric techniques to deal with missing values but they should be used with caution. 
Variables
The following sections analyze the impact of income gap on migration behavior of the seasonal migrants from Burkina Faso to Côte d'Ivoire. The income regression equation and the selection equation are both estimated before the structural migration economy can then be studied. The migration income (households with observed remittances flows) regression model is estimated using the Heckman procedure to take into account the fact that the assumption of random-participation-in-the-migration is unlikely to be true and thus, standard regression techniques would yield biased results. The dichotomous dependent variable of the selection equation is constructed considering that households who would have negative benefit of migrating may be unlikely to choose to migrate, their personal reservation income (including the local off-farm income) being greater than the income offered by moving from home. The selection binary variable, named seasonal and nonmigrant household indicator, therefore identifies the households for which the migration income is observed (34 percent of seasonal migration) or not observed. Table 2 lists the variables together with their theoretical expected sign wherever it is nonambiguous. Table A1 in appendix shows the summary statistics of independent variables for the entire sample and for the seasonal, permanent and nonmigrant households.
Empirical results
This section implements the econometric analysis and interprets successively the income model and the structural model of the migration participation. The latter evaluates the impact of the income gap corrected for selection bias.
The income model
Unlike the case of permanent migrants who live in Côte d'Ivoire, the seasonal migrants and the nonmigrants have similar monetary income sources because they cope with the same agroclimatic risks related to the semi-arid tropics (Reardon, Matlon, and Delgado 1988) . Considering the total sample in rural Sahel, 57.6 percent of the survey households The independent variables simultaneously used for the SEM income and the migration decision equations (see table 2) are: -Average area allocated to millet in the village that calculates the average per village of the mean area effectively allocated by households to millet production.
Average age of household that is the average age of the adults above 12 years old. (2003) found that stone bunds technology, used in the survey area for rainwater harvesting and soil erosion control, has the highest productivity impact in low rainfall areas. When rainfall is abundant, stone bunds retain too much water, depressing yields. This important finding motivates a special attention to the adoption of technology in designing sahelian development policy.
Another important finding is that the positive and significant effect of education passes through the channel of migration. The level of mistrust plays a negative role in migration indicating that pastoralist groups (mainly Fulbe, Gaobe and Bella ethnic groups) are less likely to move because they earn better income through livestock husbandry, especially when they are in a context where the delegation of the herd (during the slack season) to another villager is not safe. 13 The level of dead or stolen bovines found in the survey in case of delegation partly explains this result. Finally, the identifying variable (population density) plays a strong positive role on the chances of the household to migrate.
13
The survey asked if the head of household can delegate his main activity of livestock farming to tierce persons in the village. The parameters estimated under the earnings regression are the marginal effects of the regressors for the entire population. It should therefore be noted that the coefficients β can be used for inference only when analyzing the whole population. The marginal effects in the income regression for the subgroup of migrants are different from the estimated coefficients and can be obtained from equation (9)':
It follows that the marginal change in income as one continuous independent variable changes, holding all other variables constant is:
It is necessary while studying migration to evaluate these quantities because it is quite possible that the magnitude, sign, and statistical significance of the real marginal effects might all be different from those of the Heckman estimate of β (Greene, 2000) .
The outcome depends on the level of all variables in the model and is evaluated by computing the marginal effect for each observation in the sample and then averaging across all values. Table 5 shows the sample average of the effects of partial or discrete changes in the explanatory variables. Contrary to standard arguments, average marginal effects (AME) are not asymptotically equivalent with marginal effects usually computed at sample means, the latter called marginal effects at the mean (MEM) 15 are not always good estimates of the first. The difference between AME and MEM increases actually with the variance of the linear prediction of the outcome variable.
The previous interpretations of the Heckman outcomes are confirmed in the case of a seasonal migrant household (see table 5 ) and now human capital effectively has the significant positive effect on income that were captured by the selection equation in table   4. 14 i δ is strictly comprised between 0 and 1, playing then an attenuation role.
15
There are situations where the sample means used during the calculations of MEM simply refer to either nonexistent or inherently nonsensical observations. Marginal effects on E(income|mover==1) after heckman z statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% -The marginal effects on these two variables are corrected for the fact that rainfall includes more than 2 categories: low, medium and the reference group (high rainfall).
It is now interesting to contrast these effects with the case of nonmigrant group. Tables A2 and A3 (see Appendix) show the income model for nonmigration and its marginal effects respectively, under the opposite assumption of households choosing not to participate into migration. The following table 6 summarizes the related marginal effects for both groups. It clearly appears that the seasonal migration strategy in addition to help diversifying against agroclimatic risks leads to better income results. Migrant households benefit more from the village endowment in millet lands because they can invest on their agricultural plots to enhance productivity. This finding supports the argument that income diversification through migration is not a barrier to agriculture so long as migrants' labor force is available during cultivation season and innovation is made accessible through easing liquidity constraints and inducing higher risk-taking.
They suffer also more from age structure because older households can't profitably affect labor to migration. The nonmigrant has a comparative advantage in the impact of labor force on income. But households with migration strategy from the driest zones of the Sahel will have higher incomes. This outcome should be related to the unstable climatic conditions in the Sahel, which makes migration an important risk coping tool (Stark 27 1991). Given the condition of lower rainfall, households from the province Oudalan and northern Seno will have relatively higher propensity to migrate and those who are selected for migration have the highest impact on their income because they are able to better diversify their income sources. Another important result is that while population density favors income for migrant groups because it increases the likelihood of migrating through the related scarcity of local resources and social network effects, the effect will actually be negative for nonmigrant through congestion costs. This makes migration in the region a survival strategy.
Human capital seems not efficiently used in the local context while it has strong significant effect when households move to a more developed destination where the return to human capital is likely to be high, at least at individual household level. As explained above, the impact of level of mistrust is important only for migration project where migrant households who do not delegate their pastoral activities may have a better income. ~ indicates that the output is significant in the base model (Table A3) statistics in parentheses* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Now with the regression outputs of Heckman models for both selected and nonselected groups, one can estimate the income gap for each household conditional to his participation or not to migration. These results are now used to examine and compare the Todaro theory and the New Economics of Migration.
28
The structural migration decision model there is a strong and significant difference between the two groups. Column 3 in Table 8 presents the average marginal effects on migration.
Representing the average of partial and discrete changes over the observations, the computed marginal effects evaluate changes in the probability of migration. However, the computation of marginal effects on migration of an increase in age cannot hold all other variables constant, because its squared value is obviously not kept constant. The latter complication is accounted for and the total effect of age on the probability of migration includes both direct and indirect effects. The important difference in earnings found in confirmed by the positive effect of the variable "Agriculturalist ethnic group" are more accustomed to coping with cropping risks through migration strategy. Labor force as already discussed also increases the participation to migration.
To summarize, the most appealing results are the role of microeconomic theories of migration and the social capital factor in explaining seasonal migration in the Sahel.
The confirmation of Todaro's prediction means that the income gain in Côte d'Ivoire relative to the counterfactual of staying home has a strong positive effect on households' decision to migrate. There are two channels that attested the NELM. First, under low and uncertain rainfall conditions, the reduced form equation shows that households diversify incomes toward non-local migration. A second way of attesting the risk management strategy is that income variance enhances the propensity to migrate. However, a whole group of households, the pastoralists do not have access to this important income diversification and risk coping strategy because they can't safely leave their livestock behind. Livestock is a self-insurance mechanism that is also depleted in the face of agroclimatic shock and drought-induced cropping short-falls. It is therefore important to develop local labor market that allows households to hire shepherd services under secured conditions. 
Conclusion
This paper constitutes the first empirical work on migration decision inside UEMOA.
The results confirmed the prediction of the Todaro model as well as gave support to risk pooling factors as recently emphasized by the NELM.
Results supported that even under the pessimistic scenario where the direct benefits of the regional integration program would go exclusively to the polar countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, households in the West African Semi-Arid Tropics (in particular 16 Constructed using observed and predicted values of the model. As suggested by Long and Freese (2001) this is corrected for the largest row marginal.
the Sahel) may still benefit from an increased economic attractiveness of this destination.
Therefore, it can be inferred that under the conditions that polar countries in the UEMOA allow for free movement of rural labor, an increased income gap of a magnitude of 10 percent of the Sahelian average income would induce an increase of 6.3 percentage points in migration participation. Because it is seasonal, the increased migration will translate into higher liquidity that enables households to overcome credit and insurance market failures and invest in their main agropastoral activities. At the same time, households are able to smooth their consumption, which in the local context is subject to high uncertainty. The latter is shown in the results in two different ways. On the one hand, important income instability in the preceding period enhances the practice of seasonal migration. On the other hand, under low rainfall conditions, households preferably diversify incomes toward non-local migration. Migration is an important survival mechanism in the regions confronted with congestion costs and scarcity of natural resources because of the high population densities.
An interesting finding is the role of security in livestock activity. An increase in the level of mistrust among households of only 10 percentage points (insecurity in livestock activities) would decrease the probability of migration by 3.2 percentage points.
Because livestock is a widespread self-insurance mechanism in the region, it is important to develop policies that address security issues and policy makers can achieve this through institutions that develop rural labor market and enforceable rules regarding shepherd contracts called Halfinadi in the Sahel. These are contracts under which households confide their herd to another household who guards the cattle against money or in-kind remuneration. The differentiated effects on ethnic groups and places of origin suggest a specific research concerning the selection patterns of the different migration types (seasonal and permanent migrations). This implies a comparative analysis of different regions of origin in Burkina Faso. Other factors explain seasonal migration decision positively through the affiliation to the (short-growing-season) agriculturalist ethnic group, the availability of extra-labor force, education, population density and negatively through age.
Under the assumption that a household adopts migration strategy, its income is also negatively affected by age. Other variables that affect the total income of migrant 32 households are the availability of crop lands, the household's labor force, lower rainfall, education, social capital and population density. The rainfall and land availability positive effects are explained by the agricultural investments made possible through the channel of remittances. The latter finding suggests an important relationship between migration and technological innovation.
Finally the paper showed the remarkable importance of migration to the survival of landlocked Sahelian countries in UEMOA. An extension of the current study is to consider a counterfactual comparing the income prospects of migrant households with and without remittances, the latter considered as substitute for home earnings (Barham et Boucher 1998) . The approach allows considering the impact of the recent Ivorian crisis on the return migration prospects. Marginal effects on E(income|stayer==1) after heckman z statistics in parentheses * Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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